Bills fold
» Posted by GridIronMine on November 20, 2007«
This article appears in the Patriots Football Weekly and PFW online. The VF percentages quoted in this article refer to the graph presented in the hardcopy of the PFW, which uses team-dependent VF. The online tools use the team-independent (or NFL average) VF.
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The Patriots started week 11 as a heavy favorite over the Bills; similar to most weeks, the Pats had a 94% chance of winning at the opening kick, according to GridIronMine's Victory Forecast (VF) system. It did not take long for the Patriots to get to 99%. They broke their own record (set previously in the Dolphins game in week 7) by getting to 99% before 7 minutes were gone in the first quarter. In fact, they had a VF of 98% after less than 5 minutes.
The Patriots' VF suffered a brief drop to 96% after a Losman to Parrish 43 yard touchdown pass, but went back up to 99% shortly thereafter with a Moss touchdown that made it 21-7. Their VF did not drop below 98% again.
At this point, we again look at the chance for the Patriots to go undefeated. They are 10-0 and have six games left, playing home games against the Eagles, Steelers, Jets, and Dolphins, along with road games at the Ravens and Giants. The Pats will likely be a 98% or better shot to win the three home games aside from the Steelers, a 90% shot to beat the Steelers, and at least 90% to win the the two road games. Putting this all together, conservatively, the Pats have a 70% chance to go undefeated. Of course, all of this assumes that Bill Belichick does not rest starters after they have clinched home field advantage.
GridIronMine.com Nugget: A punt is a turnover
Obviously, a turnover is undesirable. However, a punt, which also ends a drive, is also a negative, although many fans and coaches do not consider it as such. This nugget looks at the difference between a drive that ends in a turnover outside of scoring position to one that ends in a punt. Keep in mind that in 2006, 43% of all drives ended in a punt and 15% ended in a turnover (with interceptions accounting for 60% of all turnovers).
One cost of a turnover is the difference in the line of scrimmage where the opponent starts its drive; if a punt is returned to the original line of scrimmage it is effectively the same as an incomplete 4th-down pass. Thus the only objective difference between a punt and a 4th-down turnover is the difference in the opponent's starting field position. An average punts nets about 35 yards of field position. Not considering end-game situations, 10 yards of field position changes Victory Forecast (VF) by approximately 2% when the lead is one score or less. In other words, a failed 4th-down conversion or a turnover on 4th down is about 7% worse than an average punt.
While that is a significant reduction in VF, it is not uncommon. For example, it is comparable to a 5-yard penalty on 1st & goal from the 1. In other words, a failed 4th-down conversion is a significant negative, but not typically a game-breaking play. This is one of many reasons GridIronMine.com often recommends trying to extend a drive on 4th and short.
The second cost of a turnover is the ending of the drive. When a drive is on life-support (4th down or 3rd and long), the end of the drive is nearly certain. Thus there is very little opportunity cost for ending the drive on a turnover, because it was probably going to end anyways on a punt or on downs. In this case, the cost of a turnover is primarily the difference in field position. For example, if the other team takes over at the same line of scrimmage, there is no objective difference between an interception on 4th down and a punt. That is why it is often better to bat down a 4th-down pass than to try to intercept it. Similarly, on 3rd and long there is no objective difference between an interception that puts the line of scrimmage 35 yards down field and an incomplete pass followed by a 35-yard net punt. Therefore, one can justify forcing a downfield throw into coverage on 3rd and long---especially if the receiver is likely to win a jump ball (which is the case with, say, Randy Moss). The average downfield interception (more than 25 yards) moves the line of scrimmage about 20 yards down the field, so a typical 3rd down interception of such a downfield pass is only 3% worse than the typical punt.
When a drive is likely to end in a punt, the cost of a turnover is the difference in field position. However, when a drive still has some promise (likely first down conversion or in field goal range), a turnover has a much larger cost, but that is another discussion.